Incident: Failed logon burst followed by successful authentication (+1 related finding)
This report was produced by an automated investigation. It presents evidence-backed findings for analyst review and does not authorise or perform any response action.
Verdict
This system does not compute a confidence score for its verdict. The evidence basis is a count of what was checked, not a measure of how likely the verdict is.
Operational
Investigation Tree
- Initial alert: Failed logon burst followed by successful authentication (+1 related finding)rules ATH-005, ATH-007; 14 seed event(s):
1f776b2d12b6e1b38138,4b7981dfd851184e370d,7ae112de50a7ef35212b,80fa003ab0d4b9fb50d3,880b1242f36a26407c74,8e3b9127b110d0908581, +8 more - ATH investigation (engine deterministic)
- endpointwhy deterministic priority order; case evidence rests on process_command_line, process_execution, process_lineage telemetry (from ATH-007)tools get_events, get_events, process_treenew events 1 retrieved; shown:
21cfbf2f84aba973509b - identitywhy deterministic priority order; case evidence rests on auth_source_attribution, authentication telemetry (from ATH-005)tools user_auth_historynew events 12 retrieved; shown:
644fcfd5011068a13cc3,7794c2b19501be2cb80b,70070eda726d0ffa9b62,3de8d5b15fb19024a732,4e51bb11a05d061eaa79,a55b4f1c91b1348a0f1c, +6 more - attackwhy only eligible specialist; case has ATT&CK mappings and domain evidence has been gatheredtools lookup_technique, lookup_technique, lookup_technique, lookup_technique
- evidence_verifierwhy validate typed observations against cited telemetry
stopped: no specialist has further useful work on the available evidence - endpoint
- Verdict: Malicious
Reasoning Summary
No model-written reasoning: this run used no model. Its reasoning is the specialist trace in the investigation tree and the findings below.
Executive Summary
This report covers CASE-001, correlating 2 detection finding(s) across 2 host(s) (WS-3250, WS-7003) and 1 account(s) (acct-8592) between 08:00:00 and 08:06:00 UTC on 2026-08-01. The evidence is consistent with activity spanning 4 MITRE ATT&CK tactic(s): Execution -> Persistence -> Credential Access -> Lateral Movement. Each mapping is an interpretation of observed behaviour against a public taxonomy, not a determination that an intrusion occurred. 28 statement(s) below are directly established by telemetry, 10 are evidence-supported inferences, and 0 are explicitly unverified hypotheses requiring analyst confirmation. This report does not authorise or perform any response action. All recommendations below require human review before action is taken.
Attack Timeline
| Time | Rule | Severity | User | Host / Movement | ATT&CK | Events |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08:00:00 | ATH-005 | CRITICAL | acct-8592 | WS-3250 | T1078, T1110.001 | 7ae112de50a7ef35212b, cbe095d06fbe19e71c8c, f2c578af54d2a3cf2d60, 880b1242f36a26407c74, ab491e62927ff53ad2e9, ffe190ee68fa49888037, +7 more |
| 08:06:00 | ATH-007 | HIGH | acct-8592 | WS-3250 | T1021.002, T1569.002 | 8e3b9127b110d0908581 |
Findings
Confirmed (FACT) (28)
- Confirmed: Authentication event 1f776b2d12b6e1b38138 records outcome failure.Evidence:
1f776b2d12b6e1b38138 - Confirmed: Event 21cfbf2f84aba973509b records process identity sysmon:2a0296a72747c0b9019b2d5f243aed94.Evidence:
21cfbf2f84aba973509b - Confirmed: Authentication event 3de8d5b15fb19024a732 records outcome success.Evidence:
3de8d5b15fb19024a732 - Confirmed: Authentication event 4b7981dfd851184e370d records outcome failure.Evidence:
4b7981dfd851184e370d - Confirmed: Authentication event 4e51bb11a05d061eaa79 records outcome success.Evidence:
4e51bb11a05d061eaa79 - Confirmed: Authentication event 644fcfd5011068a13cc3 records outcome success.Evidence:
644fcfd5011068a13cc3 - Confirmed: Authentication event 70070eda726d0ffa9b62 records outcome success.Evidence:
70070eda726d0ffa9b62 - Confirmed: Authentication event 7794c2b19501be2cb80b records outcome success.Evidence:
7794c2b19501be2cb80b - Confirmed: Authentication event 7a605231a8b8245ac918 records outcome success.Evidence:
7a605231a8b8245ac918 - Confirmed: Authentication event 7ae112de50a7ef35212b records outcome failure.Evidence:
7ae112de50a7ef35212b - Confirmed: Authentication event 7e3cdc7f3dd94475bd36 records outcome success.Evidence:
7e3cdc7f3dd94475bd36 - Confirmed: Authentication event 80fa003ab0d4b9fb50d3 records outcome failure.Evidence:
80fa003ab0d4b9fb50d3 - Confirmed: Authentication event 880b1242f36a26407c74 records outcome failure.Evidence:
880b1242f36a26407c74 - Confirmed: Event 8e3b9127b110d0908581 records process identity sysmon:f7a5977e9afb5cc7e63853a79236e480.Evidence:
8e3b9127b110d0908581 - Confirmed: Authentication event 9ad04b5d0a58bac4bdd3 records outcome success.Evidence:
9ad04b5d0a58bac4bdd3 - Confirmed: Authentication event a33f9b609b50fbceb453 records outcome success.Evidence:
a33f9b609b50fbceb453 - Confirmed: Authentication event a55b4f1c91b1348a0f1c records outcome success.Evidence:
a55b4f1c91b1348a0f1c - Confirmed: Authentication event a6ae0903817573695f09 records outcome success.Evidence:
a6ae0903817573695f09 - Confirmed: Authentication event a9f7b2ac81c66bda1ed3 records outcome success.Evidence:
a9f7b2ac81c66bda1ed3 - Confirmed: Authentication event ab491e62927ff53ad2e9 records outcome failure.Evidence:
ab491e62927ff53ad2e9 - Confirmed: Authentication event c239520d9ca451aa0921 records outcome failure.Evidence:
c239520d9ca451aa0921 - Confirmed: Authentication event cbe095d06fbe19e71c8c records outcome failure.Evidence:
cbe095d06fbe19e71c8c - Confirmed: Authentication event f07d391db002d3c8dc2c records outcome failure.Evidence:
f07d391db002d3c8dc2c - Confirmed: Authentication event f23f1f0ad8cd6cc0a54a records outcome failure.Evidence:
f23f1f0ad8cd6cc0a54a - Confirmed: Authentication event f2c578af54d2a3cf2d60 records outcome failure.Evidence:
f2c578af54d2a3cf2d60 - Confirmed: Authentication event f95a47ccf206aedc0264 records outcome success.Evidence:
f95a47ccf206aedc0264 - Confirmed: Authentication event ffe190ee68fa49888037 records outcome failure.Evidence:
ffe190ee68fa49888037 - Confirmed: Process event 8e3b9127b110d0908581 identifies the instance in 21cfbf2f84aba973509b as its parent.Evidence:
21cfbf2f84aba973509b,8e3b9127b110d0908581
Assessed (INFERENCE) (10)
- Assessed: Unverified summary: On WS-3250, cmd.exe (PID 500) was started by services.exe under account acct-8592.Evidence:
8e3b9127b110d0908581 - Assessed: Unverified summary: Execution chain on WS-3250: wininit.exe -> services.exe -> cmd.exe.Evidence:
8e3b9127b110d0908581,21cfbf2f84aba973509b - Assessed: Unverified summary: Account 'acct-8592' has 25 authentication events (12 failed, 13 successful) across hosts OFFICE-01, WS-3250.Evidence:
644fcfd5011068a13cc3,7ae112de50a7ef35212b,cbe095d06fbe19e71c8c,7794c2b19501be2cb80b,f2c578af54d2a3cf2d60,70070eda726d0ffa9b62, +19 more - Assessed: Unverified summary: Account 'acct-8592' authenticated from more than one source host: OFFICE-01, WS-7003.Evidence:
644fcfd5011068a13cc3,7ae112de50a7ef35212b,cbe095d06fbe19e71c8c,7794c2b19501be2cb80b,f2c578af54d2a3cf2d60,70070eda726d0ffa9b62, +19 more - Assessed: The 12 failed authentications for 'acct-8592' followed by success are consistent with the account's password having been guessed rather than with ordinary user error. (confidence 0.85)Evidence:
7ae112de50a7ef35212b,cbe095d06fbe19e71c8c,f2c578af54d2a3cf2d60,880b1242f36a26407c74,ab491e62927ff53ad2e9,ffe190ee68fa49888037, +6 more - Assessed: Behaviour cited by ATH-005 is consistent with T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing (Credential Access). Repeated failed authentications for a single account from a single source are consistent with systematically guessing that account's password. (A spray against many accounts would be T1110.003 and is not what was observed.) (confidence 0.90)Evidence:
7ae112de50a7ef35212b,cbe095d06fbe19e71c8c,f2c578af54d2a3cf2d60,880b1242f36a26407c74,ab491e62927ff53ad2e9,ffe190ee68fa49888037, +7 more - Assessed: Behaviour cited by ATH-007 is consistent with T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution (Execution). A command interpreter was started by the Service Control Manager, which is the defining behaviour of executing a payload as a Windows service. (confidence 0.90)Evidence:
8e3b9127b110d0908581 - Assessed: Behaviour cited by ATH-005 is consistent with T1078 Valid Accounts (Persistence). A successful authentication followed the failure burst, which is consistent with the account credential now being under adversary control. (confidence 0.60)Evidence:
7ae112de50a7ef35212b,cbe095d06fbe19e71c8c,f2c578af54d2a3cf2d60,880b1242f36a26407c74,ab491e62927ff53ad2e9,ffe190ee68fa49888037, +7 more - Assessed: Behaviour cited by ATH-007 is consistent with T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (Lateral Movement). Command output was redirected to an administrative share, indicating the service was driven over an authenticated SMB session from another host. (confidence 0.60)Evidence:
8e3b9127b110d0908581 - Assessed: The case spans 4 ATT&CK tactics (Execution -> Persistence -> Credential Access -> Lateral Movement). Progression across multiple tactics is harder to explain as coincidental than activity confined to one. (confidence 0.80)Evidence:
1f776b2d12b6e1b38138,4b7981dfd851184e370d,7ae112de50a7ef35212b,80fa003ab0d4b9fb50d3,880b1242f36a26407c74,8e3b9127b110d0908581, +8 more
Unconfirmed Hypotheses (0)
- None.
Recommended Next Steps
Investigative recommendations for a human analyst. No response action has been taken or is authorised by this report.
- Retrieve email gateway or web-proxy logs to establish the initial access vector.Rationale: No detection in this case targets initial access, so the delivery mechanism (e.g. a phishing attachment) is inferred from process lineage rather than confirmed from delivery telemetry.Based on: MITRE ATT&CK tactic coverage gap: Initial Access
- Independently verify account activity on all hosts in scope (WS-3250, WS-7003) rather than relying solely on the correlated case, in case related activity exists that current detections did not flag.Rationale: This case spans multiple hosts, which increases the possible blast radius.Based on: case.is_multi_host
- Escalate to a human analyst for validation before any remediation action is taken.Rationale: This system performs read-only investigation only. It has no capability to disable accounts, isolate hosts, or otherwise remediate, and this report is not authorisation to do so.Based on: system design constraint
Limitations & Scope
- Telemetry underlying this report came from: generated_auth_execution. Field coverage depends entirely on what the originating export or sensor captured; this project's canonical schema does not model every field a real EDR product exposes (e.g. file hashes, signer information, session identifiers), and any of those were dropped during normalization.
- ATT&CK mappings are interpretations of observed behaviour against a public taxonomy. They indicate that behaviour is consistent with a technique, not that an adversary performed it.
- Grouping confidence describes how strongly correlated findings are linked to each other, not whether an intrusion occurred.
- No evidence was found for the following ATT&CK tactics: Initial Access, Discovery, Collection, Exfiltration. Their absence may reflect that the activity did not occur, or that available telemetry cannot observe it.
- Typed predicates are checked against recorded telemetry; free-text interpretations are not semantically verified. Missing identity is not a confirmed process link, and recorded event order does not establish causation.
- No evidence was found for the following tactics: Collection. Their absence may reflect either that the activity did not occur or that we lack the telemetry to see it.
Investigation Trace
Agents run: endpoint, identity, attack; tool calls made: 8
- step 1: endpoint -- deterministic priority order; case evidence rests on process_command_line, process_execution, process_lineage telemetry (from ATH-007)
- step 2: identity -- deterministic priority order; case evidence rests on auth_source_attribution, authentication telemetry (from ATH-005)
- step 3: attack -- only eligible specialist; case has ATT&CK mappings and domain evidence has been gathered
- step 4: stop -- no specialist has further useful work on the available evidence
- evidence verification: 28 checked observations; 4 summaries reclassified
Evidence Appendix
All 27 telemetry events underlying this report, chronologically.
| Event ID | Time | Device | User | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
644fcfd5011068a13cc3 | 08:00:00 | OFFICE-01 | acct-8592 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
7ae112de50a7ef35212b | 08:00:00 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
21cfbf2f84aba973509b | 08:00:00 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | wininit.exe -> services.exe | services.exe |
cbe095d06fbe19e71c8c | 08:00:20 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
7794c2b19501be2cb80b | 08:00:29 | OFFICE-01 | acct-8592 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
f2c578af54d2a3cf2d60 | 08:00:40 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
70070eda726d0ffa9b62 | 08:00:58 | OFFICE-01 | acct-8592 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
880b1242f36a26407c74 | 08:01:00 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
ab491e62927ff53ad2e9 | 08:01:20 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
3de8d5b15fb19024a732 | 08:01:27 | OFFICE-01 | acct-8592 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
ffe190ee68fa49888037 | 08:01:40 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
4e51bb11a05d061eaa79 | 08:01:56 | OFFICE-01 | acct-8592 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
f07d391db002d3c8dc2c | 08:02:00 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
1f776b2d12b6e1b38138 | 08:02:20 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
a55b4f1c91b1348a0f1c | 08:02:25 | OFFICE-01 | acct-8592 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
80fa003ab0d4b9fb50d3 | 08:02:40 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
a9f7b2ac81c66bda1ed3 | 08:02:54 | OFFICE-01 | acct-8592 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
4b7981dfd851184e370d | 08:03:00 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
f23f1f0ad8cd6cc0a54a | 08:03:20 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
a33f9b609b50fbceb453 | 08:03:23 | OFFICE-01 | acct-8592 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
c239520d9ca451aa0921 | 08:03:40 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
7e3cdc7f3dd94475bd36 | 08:03:52 | OFFICE-01 | acct-8592 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
f95a47ccf206aedc0264 | 08:04:21 | OFFICE-01 | acct-8592 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
7a605231a8b8245ac918 | 08:04:50 | OFFICE-01 | acct-8592 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
a6ae0903817573695f09 | 08:05:00 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | success logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 |
9ad04b5d0a58bac4bdd3 | 08:05:19 | OFFICE-01 | acct-8592 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
8e3b9127b110d0908581 | 08:06:00 | WS-3250 | acct-8592 | services.exe -> cmd.exe | cmd.exe /Q /c job.cmd 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\job.log 2>&1 |