Incident: Failed logon burst followed by successful authentication (+1 related finding)
This report was produced by an automated investigation. It presents evidence-backed findings for analyst review and does not authorise or perform any response action.
Verdict
This system does not compute a confidence score for its verdict. The evidence basis is a count of what was checked, not a measure of how likely the verdict is.
Investigation Tree
- Initial alert: Failed logon burst followed by successful authentication (+1 related finding)rules ATH-005, ATH-007; 14 seed event(s):
00bb709b987db814f5f7,044f5c9c5bf34ddb9030,0f504253fd98db142c3c,2dbb1b538a03d94bbf88,3266b536dc39708fc00c,3608f02fef656b43e91e, +8 more - ATH investigation (engine deterministic)
- endpointwhy deterministic priority order; case evidence rests on process_command_line, process_execution, process_lineage telemetry (from ATH-007)tools get_events, get_events, process_treenew events 2 retrieved; shown:
77646b919268d3358b14,ccec78fe2c3fa29b518b - identitywhy deterministic priority order; case evidence rests on auth_source_attribution, authentication telemetry (from ATH-005)tools user_auth_historynew events 12 retrieved; shown:
77a081a8abe68e4b98fb,ce61a2216c4bafb83a03,8ef9c0146e5d74005d89,9e17252a5ff4c89350e3,0970881ea56161a67f86,20f4c8a616092dce879f, +6 more - attackwhy only eligible specialist; case has ATT&CK mappings and domain evidence has been gatheredtools lookup_technique, lookup_technique, lookup_technique, lookup_technique
- evidence_verifierwhy validate typed observations against cited telemetry
stopped: no specialist has further useful work on the available evidence - endpoint
- Verdict: Malicious
Reasoning Summary
No model-written reasoning: this run used no model. Its reasoning is the specialist trace in the investigation tree and the findings below.
Executive Summary
This report covers CASE-001, correlating 2 detection finding(s) across 2 host(s) (WS-2924, WS-6254) and 1 account(s) (acct-7085) between 08:00:00 and 08:06:00 UTC on 2026-08-01. The evidence is consistent with activity spanning 4 MITRE ATT&CK tactic(s): Execution -> Persistence -> Credential Access -> Lateral Movement. Each mapping is an interpretation of observed behaviour against a public taxonomy, not a determination that an intrusion occurred. 30 statement(s) below are directly established by telemetry, 11 are evidence-supported inferences, and 0 are explicitly unverified hypotheses requiring analyst confirmation. This report does not authorise or perform any response action. All recommendations below require human review before action is taken.
Attack Timeline
| Time | Rule | Severity | User | Host / Movement | ATT&CK | Events |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08:00:00 | ATH-005 | CRITICAL | acct-7085 | WS-2924 | T1078, T1110.001 | 72d5a08e0d2a8522ca5a, 2dbb1b538a03d94bbf88, 7b13f31085bbf14dad61, 6cab6426bbe2ef08ea74, 00bb709b987db814f5f7, 3266b536dc39708fc00c, +7 more |
| 08:06:00 | ATH-007 | HIGH | acct-7085 | WS-2924 | T1021.002, T1569.002 | 703eeb16d25835efecb7 |
Findings
Confirmed (FACT) (30)
- Confirmed: Authentication event 00bb709b987db814f5f7 records outcome failure.Evidence:
00bb709b987db814f5f7 - Confirmed: Authentication event 044f5c9c5bf34ddb9030 records outcome failure.Evidence:
044f5c9c5bf34ddb9030 - Confirmed: Authentication event 0970881ea56161a67f86 records outcome success.Evidence:
0970881ea56161a67f86 - Confirmed: Authentication event 0f504253fd98db142c3c records outcome success.Evidence:
0f504253fd98db142c3c - Confirmed: Authentication event 20f4c8a616092dce879f records outcome success.Evidence:
20f4c8a616092dce879f - Confirmed: Authentication event 2dbb1b538a03d94bbf88 records outcome failure.Evidence:
2dbb1b538a03d94bbf88 - Confirmed: Authentication event 3266b536dc39708fc00c records outcome failure.Evidence:
3266b536dc39708fc00c - Confirmed: Authentication event 3608f02fef656b43e91e records outcome failure.Evidence:
3608f02fef656b43e91e - Confirmed: Authentication event 5003aa10b50984605fdb records outcome success.Evidence:
5003aa10b50984605fdb - Confirmed: Authentication event 67d1611c59fa66806fc5 records outcome success.Evidence:
67d1611c59fa66806fc5 - Confirmed: Authentication event 680a11b09c06415c434a records outcome failure.Evidence:
680a11b09c06415c434a - Confirmed: Authentication event 6cab6426bbe2ef08ea74 records outcome failure.Evidence:
6cab6426bbe2ef08ea74 - Confirmed: Event 703eeb16d25835efecb7 records process identity sysmon:5b6186501e6faefbb89acd575f1415ab.Evidence:
703eeb16d25835efecb7 - Confirmed: Authentication event 72d5a08e0d2a8522ca5a records outcome failure.Evidence:
72d5a08e0d2a8522ca5a - Confirmed: Event 77646b919268d3358b14 records process identity sysmon:a985464622e9b1d8aead361db1929408.Evidence:
77646b919268d3358b14 - Confirmed: Authentication event 77a081a8abe68e4b98fb records outcome success.Evidence:
77a081a8abe68e4b98fb - Confirmed: Authentication event 7b13f31085bbf14dad61 records outcome failure.Evidence:
7b13f31085bbf14dad61 - Confirmed: Authentication event 8673afefe5f419af246a records outcome success.Evidence:
8673afefe5f419af246a - Confirmed: Authentication event 8ef9c0146e5d74005d89 records outcome success.Evidence:
8ef9c0146e5d74005d89 - Confirmed: Authentication event 96d505a664df60a94a7c records outcome failure.Evidence:
96d505a664df60a94a7c - Confirmed: Authentication event 9e17252a5ff4c89350e3 records outcome success.Evidence:
9e17252a5ff4c89350e3 - Confirmed: Authentication event b555ce4aa91f923b04ff records outcome success.Evidence:
b555ce4aa91f923b04ff - Confirmed: Authentication event c786d4eda4108402ebd7 records outcome success.Evidence:
c786d4eda4108402ebd7 - Confirmed: Event ccec78fe2c3fa29b518b records process identity sysmon:3b438f257d488c7aa682ff0330ba9507.Evidence:
ccec78fe2c3fa29b518b - Confirmed: Authentication event ce61a2216c4bafb83a03 records outcome success.Evidence:
ce61a2216c4bafb83a03 - Confirmed: Authentication event dcedb070ce7492a69e6a records outcome success.Evidence:
dcedb070ce7492a69e6a - Confirmed: Authentication event edf4a27fb63329509cc1 records outcome failure.Evidence:
edf4a27fb63329509cc1 - Confirmed: Authentication event f0ebb167f3e1fca60b93 records outcome failure.Evidence:
f0ebb167f3e1fca60b93 - Confirmed: Process event 703eeb16d25835efecb7 identifies the instance in 77646b919268d3358b14 as its parent.Evidence:
77646b919268d3358b14,703eeb16d25835efecb7 - Confirmed: Process event ccec78fe2c3fa29b518b identifies the instance in 703eeb16d25835efecb7 as its parent.Evidence:
703eeb16d25835efecb7,ccec78fe2c3fa29b518b
Assessed (INFERENCE) (11)
- Assessed: Unverified summary: On WS-2924, cmd.exe (PID 500) was started by services.exe under account acct-7085.Evidence:
703eeb16d25835efecb7 - Assessed: Unverified summary: Execution chain on WS-2924: wininit.exe -> services.exe -> cmd.exe.Evidence:
703eeb16d25835efecb7,77646b919268d3358b14 - Assessed: Unverified summary: cmd.exe (PID 500) on WS-2924 spawned 1 child process(es): reg.exe.Evidence:
ccec78fe2c3fa29b518b - Assessed: Unverified summary: Account 'acct-7085' has 25 authentication events (12 failed, 13 successful) across hosts OFFICE-01, WS-2924.Evidence:
77a081a8abe68e4b98fb,72d5a08e0d2a8522ca5a,2dbb1b538a03d94bbf88,ce61a2216c4bafb83a03,7b13f31085bbf14dad61,8ef9c0146e5d74005d89, +19 more - Assessed: Unverified summary: Account 'acct-7085' authenticated from more than one source host: OFFICE-01, WS-6254.Evidence:
77a081a8abe68e4b98fb,72d5a08e0d2a8522ca5a,2dbb1b538a03d94bbf88,ce61a2216c4bafb83a03,7b13f31085bbf14dad61,8ef9c0146e5d74005d89, +19 more - Assessed: The 12 failed authentications for 'acct-7085' followed by success are consistent with the account's password having been guessed rather than with ordinary user error. (confidence 0.85)Evidence:
72d5a08e0d2a8522ca5a,2dbb1b538a03d94bbf88,7b13f31085bbf14dad61,6cab6426bbe2ef08ea74,00bb709b987db814f5f7,3266b536dc39708fc00c, +6 more - Assessed: Behaviour cited by ATH-005 is consistent with T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing (Credential Access). Repeated failed authentications for a single account from a single source are consistent with systematically guessing that account's password. (A spray against many accounts would be T1110.003 and is not what was observed.) (confidence 0.90)Evidence:
72d5a08e0d2a8522ca5a,2dbb1b538a03d94bbf88,7b13f31085bbf14dad61,6cab6426bbe2ef08ea74,00bb709b987db814f5f7,3266b536dc39708fc00c, +7 more - Assessed: Behaviour cited by ATH-007 is consistent with T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution (Execution). A command interpreter was started by the Service Control Manager, which is the defining behaviour of executing a payload as a Windows service. (confidence 0.90)Evidence:
703eeb16d25835efecb7 - Assessed: Behaviour cited by ATH-005 is consistent with T1078 Valid Accounts (Persistence). A successful authentication followed the failure burst, which is consistent with the account credential now being under adversary control. (confidence 0.60)Evidence:
72d5a08e0d2a8522ca5a,2dbb1b538a03d94bbf88,7b13f31085bbf14dad61,6cab6426bbe2ef08ea74,00bb709b987db814f5f7,3266b536dc39708fc00c, +7 more - Assessed: Behaviour cited by ATH-007 is consistent with T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (Lateral Movement). Command output was redirected to an administrative share, indicating the service was driven over an authenticated SMB session from another host. (confidence 0.60)Evidence:
703eeb16d25835efecb7 - Assessed: The case spans 4 ATT&CK tactics (Execution -> Persistence -> Credential Access -> Lateral Movement). Progression across multiple tactics is harder to explain as coincidental than activity confined to one. (confidence 0.80)Evidence:
00bb709b987db814f5f7,044f5c9c5bf34ddb9030,0f504253fd98db142c3c,2dbb1b538a03d94bbf88,3266b536dc39708fc00c,3608f02fef656b43e91e, +8 more
Unconfirmed Hypotheses (0)
- None.
Recommended Next Steps
Investigative recommendations for a human analyst. No response action has been taken or is authorised by this report.
- Retrieve email gateway or web-proxy logs to establish the initial access vector.Rationale: No detection in this case targets initial access, so the delivery mechanism (e.g. a phishing attachment) is inferred from process lineage rather than confirmed from delivery telemetry.Based on: MITRE ATT&CK tactic coverage gap: Initial Access
- Independently verify account activity on all hosts in scope (WS-2924, WS-6254) rather than relying solely on the correlated case, in case related activity exists that current detections did not flag.Rationale: This case spans multiple hosts, which increases the possible blast radius.Based on: case.is_multi_host
- Escalate to a human analyst for validation before any remediation action is taken.Rationale: This system performs read-only investigation only. It has no capability to disable accounts, isolate hosts, or otherwise remediate, and this report is not authorisation to do so.Based on: system design constraint
Limitations & Scope
- Telemetry underlying this report came from: generated_auth_execution. Field coverage depends entirely on what the originating export or sensor captured; this project's canonical schema does not model every field a real EDR product exposes (e.g. file hashes, signer information, session identifiers), and any of those were dropped during normalization.
- ATT&CK mappings are interpretations of observed behaviour against a public taxonomy. They indicate that behaviour is consistent with a technique, not that an adversary performed it.
- Grouping confidence describes how strongly correlated findings are linked to each other, not whether an intrusion occurred.
- No evidence was found for the following ATT&CK tactics: Initial Access, Discovery, Collection, Exfiltration. Their absence may reflect that the activity did not occur, or that available telemetry cannot observe it.
- Typed predicates are checked against recorded telemetry; free-text interpretations are not semantically verified. Missing identity is not a confirmed process link, and recorded event order does not establish causation.
- No evidence was found for the following tactics: Collection. Their absence may reflect either that the activity did not occur or that we lack the telemetry to see it.
Investigation Trace
Agents run: endpoint, identity, attack; tool calls made: 8
- step 1: endpoint -- deterministic priority order; case evidence rests on process_command_line, process_execution, process_lineage telemetry (from ATH-007)
- step 2: identity -- deterministic priority order; case evidence rests on auth_source_attribution, authentication telemetry (from ATH-005)
- step 3: attack -- only eligible specialist; case has ATT&CK mappings and domain evidence has been gathered
- step 4: stop -- no specialist has further useful work on the available evidence
- evidence verification: 30 checked observations; 5 summaries reclassified
Evidence Appendix
All 28 telemetry events underlying this report, chronologically.
| Event ID | Time | Device | User | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
72d5a08e0d2a8522ca5a | 08:00:00 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
77646b919268d3358b14 | 08:00:00 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | wininit.exe -> services.exe | services.exe |
77a081a8abe68e4b98fb | 08:00:00 | OFFICE-01 | acct-7085 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
2dbb1b538a03d94bbf88 | 08:00:20 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
ce61a2216c4bafb83a03 | 08:00:29 | OFFICE-01 | acct-7085 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
7b13f31085bbf14dad61 | 08:00:40 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
8ef9c0146e5d74005d89 | 08:00:58 | OFFICE-01 | acct-7085 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
6cab6426bbe2ef08ea74 | 08:01:00 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
00bb709b987db814f5f7 | 08:01:20 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
9e17252a5ff4c89350e3 | 08:01:27 | OFFICE-01 | acct-7085 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
3266b536dc39708fc00c | 08:01:40 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
0970881ea56161a67f86 | 08:01:56 | OFFICE-01 | acct-7085 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
edf4a27fb63329509cc1 | 08:02:00 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
680a11b09c06415c434a | 08:02:20 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
20f4c8a616092dce879f | 08:02:25 | OFFICE-01 | acct-7085 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
044f5c9c5bf34ddb9030 | 08:02:40 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
8673afefe5f419af246a | 08:02:54 | OFFICE-01 | acct-7085 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
f0ebb167f3e1fca60b93 | 08:03:00 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
96d505a664df60a94a7c | 08:03:20 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
67d1611c59fa66806fc5 | 08:03:23 | OFFICE-01 | acct-7085 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
3608f02fef656b43e91e | 08:03:40 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
c786d4eda4108402ebd7 | 08:03:52 | OFFICE-01 | acct-7085 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
5003aa10b50984605fdb | 08:04:21 | OFFICE-01 | acct-7085 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
dcedb070ce7492a69e6a | 08:04:50 | OFFICE-01 | acct-7085 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
0f504253fd98db142c3c | 08:05:00 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | success logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 |
b555ce4aa91f923b04ff | 08:05:19 | OFFICE-01 | acct-7085 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
703eeb16d25835efecb7 | 08:06:00 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | services.exe -> cmd.exe | cmd.exe /Q /c job.cmd 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\job.log 2>&1 |
ccec78fe2c3fa29b518b | 08:06:05 | WS-2924 | acct-7085 | cmd.exe -> reg.exe | reg.exe save HKLM\SAM C:\ProgramData\sam.hiv /y |