Incident: Failed logon burst followed by successful authentication (+1 related finding)
This report was produced by an automated investigation. It presents evidence-backed findings for analyst review and does not authorise or perform any response action.
Verdict
This system does not compute a confidence score for its verdict. The evidence basis is a count of what was checked, not a measure of how likely the verdict is.
Investigation Tree
- Initial alert: Failed logon burst followed by successful authentication (+1 related finding)rules ATH-005, ATH-007; 14 seed event(s):
0adbb9ef85b9188c8683,0cb61159ea3d69dcc87a,0cc680d6694f1f8615a1,2108af7a380995a548b5,3bdd60cc3a5a97b84519,67a9f5bfab28871757dd, +8 more - ATH investigation (engine deterministic)
- endpointwhy deterministic priority order; case evidence rests on process_command_line, process_execution, process_lineage telemetry (from ATH-007)tools get_events, get_events, process_treenew events 2 retrieved; shown:
98c80712635dec2f3738,0b092d00f3798939dd00 - identitywhy deterministic priority order; case evidence rests on auth_source_attribution, authentication telemetry (from ATH-005)tools user_auth_historynew events 12 retrieved; shown:
0ce208dd57c057228f55,8144033a5e9cd2c19c38,78274bf69ec1ff508093,c532eb018e1154acca2e,7c156d83425329cf030a,0d4ac76c0560bdbb704b, +6 more - attackwhy only eligible specialist; case has ATT&CK mappings and domain evidence has been gatheredtools lookup_technique, lookup_technique, lookup_technique, lookup_technique
- evidence_verifierwhy validate typed observations against cited telemetry
stopped: no specialist has further useful work on the available evidence - endpoint
- Verdict: Malicious
Reasoning Summary
No model-written reasoning: this run used no model. Its reasoning is the specialist trace in the investigation tree and the findings below.
Executive Summary
This report covers CASE-001, correlating 2 detection finding(s) across 2 host(s) (WS-2138, WS-9673) and 1 account(s) (acct-2520) between 08:00:00 and 08:06:00 UTC on 2026-08-01. The evidence is consistent with activity spanning 4 MITRE ATT&CK tactic(s): Execution -> Persistence -> Credential Access -> Lateral Movement. Each mapping is an interpretation of observed behaviour against a public taxonomy, not a determination that an intrusion occurred. 30 statement(s) below are directly established by telemetry, 11 are evidence-supported inferences, and 0 are explicitly unverified hypotheses requiring analyst confirmation. This report does not authorise or perform any response action. All recommendations below require human review before action is taken.
Attack Timeline
| Time | Rule | Severity | User | Host / Movement | ATT&CK | Events |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08:00:00 | ATH-005 | CRITICAL | acct-2520 | WS-9673 | T1078, T1110.001 | 0cb61159ea3d69dcc87a, d92873fb243f9f0bcb0d, 3bdd60cc3a5a97b84519, a068ff51cd2cb23d2f8d, 2108af7a380995a548b5, 6e10a5cc29314bc6a964, +7 more |
| 08:06:00 | ATH-007 | HIGH | acct-2520 | WS-9673 | T1021.002, T1569.002 | c1aa4d45ddf2102946f7 |
Findings
Confirmed (FACT) (30)
- Confirmed: Authentication event 0adbb9ef85b9188c8683 records outcome failure.Evidence:
0adbb9ef85b9188c8683 - Confirmed: Event 0b092d00f3798939dd00 records process identity sysmon:399d50933db741bad79daec0f397fe8d.Evidence:
0b092d00f3798939dd00 - Confirmed: Authentication event 0cb61159ea3d69dcc87a records outcome failure.Evidence:
0cb61159ea3d69dcc87a - Confirmed: Authentication event 0cc680d6694f1f8615a1 records outcome failure.Evidence:
0cc680d6694f1f8615a1 - Confirmed: Authentication event 0ce208dd57c057228f55 records outcome success.Evidence:
0ce208dd57c057228f55 - Confirmed: Authentication event 0d4ac76c0560bdbb704b records outcome success.Evidence:
0d4ac76c0560bdbb704b - Confirmed: Authentication event 2108af7a380995a548b5 records outcome failure.Evidence:
2108af7a380995a548b5 - Confirmed: Authentication event 3bdd60cc3a5a97b84519 records outcome failure.Evidence:
3bdd60cc3a5a97b84519 - Confirmed: Authentication event 5c0abbbce84e1b2a43fa records outcome success.Evidence:
5c0abbbce84e1b2a43fa - Confirmed: Authentication event 67a9f5bfab28871757dd records outcome success.Evidence:
67a9f5bfab28871757dd - Confirmed: Authentication event 6e10a5cc29314bc6a964 records outcome failure.Evidence:
6e10a5cc29314bc6a964 - Confirmed: Authentication event 78274bf69ec1ff508093 records outcome success.Evidence:
78274bf69ec1ff508093 - Confirmed: Authentication event 7c156d83425329cf030a records outcome success.Evidence:
7c156d83425329cf030a - Confirmed: Authentication event 8144033a5e9cd2c19c38 records outcome success.Evidence:
8144033a5e9cd2c19c38 - Confirmed: Authentication event 8407329aafd15d9c0a9e records outcome failure.Evidence:
8407329aafd15d9c0a9e - Confirmed: Event 98c80712635dec2f3738 records process identity sysmon:b06bb26c2e219a238c5b67fc124fd6ea.Evidence:
98c80712635dec2f3738 - Confirmed: Authentication event 9ad22469dab49a3df6fc records outcome success.Evidence:
9ad22469dab49a3df6fc - Confirmed: Authentication event 9b73d640145c27f1eddb records outcome success.Evidence:
9b73d640145c27f1eddb - Confirmed: Authentication event a068ff51cd2cb23d2f8d records outcome failure.Evidence:
a068ff51cd2cb23d2f8d - Confirmed: Authentication event a3bf61cc981c8d0cdd5d records outcome failure.Evidence:
a3bf61cc981c8d0cdd5d - Confirmed: Authentication event bc5bc87bcd4bf9827807 records outcome failure.Evidence:
bc5bc87bcd4bf9827807 - Confirmed: Event c1aa4d45ddf2102946f7 records process identity sysmon:ffa91f20286f6ae3e86e4b01e0c39444.Evidence:
c1aa4d45ddf2102946f7 - Confirmed: Authentication event c532eb018e1154acca2e records outcome success.Evidence:
c532eb018e1154acca2e - Confirmed: Authentication event d92873fb243f9f0bcb0d records outcome failure.Evidence:
d92873fb243f9f0bcb0d - Confirmed: Authentication event dfd20d6fe31907ff2b86 records outcome success.Evidence:
dfd20d6fe31907ff2b86 - Confirmed: Authentication event e5a3cce5c1c4a821f59d records outcome success.Evidence:
e5a3cce5c1c4a821f59d - Confirmed: Authentication event f6497a719ee487d49e5a records outcome failure.Evidence:
f6497a719ee487d49e5a - Confirmed: Authentication event fbe91286e9d9acc93b9e records outcome success.Evidence:
fbe91286e9d9acc93b9e - Confirmed: Process event 0b092d00f3798939dd00 identifies the instance in c1aa4d45ddf2102946f7 as its parent.Evidence:
c1aa4d45ddf2102946f7,0b092d00f3798939dd00 - Confirmed: Process event c1aa4d45ddf2102946f7 identifies the instance in 98c80712635dec2f3738 as its parent.Evidence:
98c80712635dec2f3738,c1aa4d45ddf2102946f7
Assessed (INFERENCE) (11)
- Assessed: Unverified summary: On WS-9673, cmd.exe (PID 500) was started by services.exe under account acct-2520.Evidence:
c1aa4d45ddf2102946f7 - Assessed: Unverified summary: Execution chain on WS-9673: wininit.exe -> services.exe -> cmd.exe.Evidence:
c1aa4d45ddf2102946f7,98c80712635dec2f3738 - Assessed: Unverified summary: cmd.exe (PID 500) on WS-9673 spawned 1 child process(es): dism.exe.Evidence:
0b092d00f3798939dd00 - Assessed: Unverified summary: Account 'acct-2520' has 25 authentication events (12 failed, 13 successful) across hosts OFFICE-01, WS-9673.Evidence:
0ce208dd57c057228f55,0cb61159ea3d69dcc87a,d92873fb243f9f0bcb0d,8144033a5e9cd2c19c38,3bdd60cc3a5a97b84519,78274bf69ec1ff508093, +19 more - Assessed: Unverified summary: Account 'acct-2520' authenticated from more than one source host: OFFICE-01, WS-2138.Evidence:
0ce208dd57c057228f55,0cb61159ea3d69dcc87a,d92873fb243f9f0bcb0d,8144033a5e9cd2c19c38,3bdd60cc3a5a97b84519,78274bf69ec1ff508093, +19 more - Assessed: The 12 failed authentications for 'acct-2520' followed by success are consistent with the account's password having been guessed rather than with ordinary user error. (confidence 0.85)Evidence:
0cb61159ea3d69dcc87a,d92873fb243f9f0bcb0d,3bdd60cc3a5a97b84519,a068ff51cd2cb23d2f8d,2108af7a380995a548b5,6e10a5cc29314bc6a964, +6 more - Assessed: Behaviour cited by ATH-005 is consistent with T1110.001 Brute Force: Password Guessing (Credential Access). Repeated failed authentications for a single account from a single source are consistent with systematically guessing that account's password. (A spray against many accounts would be T1110.003 and is not what was observed.) (confidence 0.90)Evidence:
0cb61159ea3d69dcc87a,d92873fb243f9f0bcb0d,3bdd60cc3a5a97b84519,a068ff51cd2cb23d2f8d,2108af7a380995a548b5,6e10a5cc29314bc6a964, +7 more - Assessed: Behaviour cited by ATH-007 is consistent with T1569.002 System Services: Service Execution (Execution). A command interpreter was started by the Service Control Manager, which is the defining behaviour of executing a payload as a Windows service. (confidence 0.90)Evidence:
c1aa4d45ddf2102946f7 - Assessed: Behaviour cited by ATH-005 is consistent with T1078 Valid Accounts (Persistence). A successful authentication followed the failure burst, which is consistent with the account credential now being under adversary control. (confidence 0.60)Evidence:
0cb61159ea3d69dcc87a,d92873fb243f9f0bcb0d,3bdd60cc3a5a97b84519,a068ff51cd2cb23d2f8d,2108af7a380995a548b5,6e10a5cc29314bc6a964, +7 more - Assessed: Behaviour cited by ATH-007 is consistent with T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (Lateral Movement). Command output was redirected to an administrative share, indicating the service was driven over an authenticated SMB session from another host. (confidence 0.60)Evidence:
c1aa4d45ddf2102946f7 - Assessed: The case spans 4 ATT&CK tactics (Execution -> Persistence -> Credential Access -> Lateral Movement). Progression across multiple tactics is harder to explain as coincidental than activity confined to one. (confidence 0.80)Evidence:
0adbb9ef85b9188c8683,0cb61159ea3d69dcc87a,0cc680d6694f1f8615a1,2108af7a380995a548b5,3bdd60cc3a5a97b84519,67a9f5bfab28871757dd, +8 more
Unconfirmed Hypotheses (0)
- None.
Recommended Next Steps
Investigative recommendations for a human analyst. No response action has been taken or is authorised by this report.
- Retrieve email gateway or web-proxy logs to establish the initial access vector.Rationale: No detection in this case targets initial access, so the delivery mechanism (e.g. a phishing attachment) is inferred from process lineage rather than confirmed from delivery telemetry.Based on: MITRE ATT&CK tactic coverage gap: Initial Access
- Independently verify account activity on all hosts in scope (WS-2138, WS-9673) rather than relying solely on the correlated case, in case related activity exists that current detections did not flag.Rationale: This case spans multiple hosts, which increases the possible blast radius.Based on: case.is_multi_host
- Escalate to a human analyst for validation before any remediation action is taken.Rationale: This system performs read-only investigation only. It has no capability to disable accounts, isolate hosts, or otherwise remediate, and this report is not authorisation to do so.Based on: system design constraint
Limitations & Scope
- Telemetry underlying this report came from: generated_auth_execution. Field coverage depends entirely on what the originating export or sensor captured; this project's canonical schema does not model every field a real EDR product exposes (e.g. file hashes, signer information, session identifiers), and any of those were dropped during normalization.
- ATT&CK mappings are interpretations of observed behaviour against a public taxonomy. They indicate that behaviour is consistent with a technique, not that an adversary performed it.
- Grouping confidence describes how strongly correlated findings are linked to each other, not whether an intrusion occurred.
- No evidence was found for the following ATT&CK tactics: Initial Access, Discovery, Collection, Exfiltration. Their absence may reflect that the activity did not occur, or that available telemetry cannot observe it.
- Typed predicates are checked against recorded telemetry; free-text interpretations are not semantically verified. Missing identity is not a confirmed process link, and recorded event order does not establish causation.
- No evidence was found for the following tactics: Collection. Their absence may reflect either that the activity did not occur or that we lack the telemetry to see it.
Investigation Trace
Agents run: endpoint, identity, attack; tool calls made: 8
- step 1: endpoint -- deterministic priority order; case evidence rests on process_command_line, process_execution, process_lineage telemetry (from ATH-007)
- step 2: identity -- deterministic priority order; case evidence rests on auth_source_attribution, authentication telemetry (from ATH-005)
- step 3: attack -- only eligible specialist; case has ATT&CK mappings and domain evidence has been gathered
- step 4: stop -- no specialist has further useful work on the available evidence
- evidence verification: 30 checked observations; 5 summaries reclassified
Evidence Appendix
All 28 telemetry events underlying this report, chronologically.
| Event ID | Time | Device | User | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
0cb61159ea3d69dcc87a | 08:00:00 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
98c80712635dec2f3738 | 08:00:00 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | wininit.exe -> services.exe | services.exe |
0ce208dd57c057228f55 | 08:00:00 | OFFICE-01 | acct-2520 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
d92873fb243f9f0bcb0d | 08:00:20 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
8144033a5e9cd2c19c38 | 08:00:29 | OFFICE-01 | acct-2520 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
3bdd60cc3a5a97b84519 | 08:00:40 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
78274bf69ec1ff508093 | 08:00:58 | OFFICE-01 | acct-2520 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
a068ff51cd2cb23d2f8d | 08:01:00 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
2108af7a380995a548b5 | 08:01:20 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
c532eb018e1154acca2e | 08:01:27 | OFFICE-01 | acct-2520 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
6e10a5cc29314bc6a964 | 08:01:40 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
7c156d83425329cf030a | 08:01:56 | OFFICE-01 | acct-2520 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
a3bf61cc981c8d0cdd5d | 08:02:00 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
f6497a719ee487d49e5a | 08:02:20 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
0d4ac76c0560bdbb704b | 08:02:25 | OFFICE-01 | acct-2520 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
0cc680d6694f1f8615a1 | 08:02:40 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
dfd20d6fe31907ff2b86 | 08:02:54 | OFFICE-01 | acct-2520 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
8407329aafd15d9c0a9e | 08:03:00 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
0adbb9ef85b9188c8683 | 08:03:20 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
fbe91286e9d9acc93b9e | 08:03:23 | OFFICE-01 | acct-2520 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
bc5bc87bcd4bf9827807 | 08:03:40 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | failure logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 reason=bad_password |
e5a3cce5c1c4a821f59d | 08:03:52 | OFFICE-01 | acct-2520 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
9ad22469dab49a3df6fc | 08:04:21 | OFFICE-01 | acct-2520 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
5c0abbbce84e1b2a43fa | 08:04:50 | OFFICE-01 | acct-2520 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
67a9f5bfab28871757dd | 08:05:00 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | success logon [Network (SMB / share access)] from 10.10.2.8 |
9b73d640145c27f1eddb | 08:05:19 | OFFICE-01 | acct-2520 | success logon [Interactive (console)] from 10.10.1.5 |
c1aa4d45ddf2102946f7 | 08:06:00 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | services.exe -> cmd.exe | cmd.exe /Q /c job.cmd 1> \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN$\job.log 2>&1 |
0b092d00f3798939dd00 | 08:06:05 | WS-9673 | acct-2520 | cmd.exe -> dism.exe | dism.exe /Online /Cleanup-Image /ScanHealth |